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Abstract
Role mining tackles the problem of finding a role-based access control (RBAC) con-
figuration, given an access-control matrix assigning users to access permissions as input.
Most role mining approaches work by constructing a large set of candidate roles and use
a greedy selection strategy to iteratively pick a small subset such that the differences
between the resulting RBAC configuration and the access control matrix are minimized.
In this paper, we advocate an alternative approach that recasts role mining as an infer-
ence problem rather than a lossy compression problem. Instead of using combinatorial
algorithms to minimize the number of roles needed to represent the access-control ma-
trix, we derive probabilistic models to learn the RBAC configuration that most likely
underlies the given matrix.
Our models are generative in that they reflect the way that permissions are assigned
to users in a given RBAC configuration. We additionally model how user-permission
assignments that conflict with an RBAC configuration emerge and we investigate the
influence of constraints on role hierarchies and on the number of assignments. In experi-
ments with access-control matrices from real-world enterprises, we compare our proposed
models with other role mining methods. Our results show that our probabilistic models
infer roles that generalize well to new system users for a wide variety of data, while other
models’ generalization abilities depend on the dataset given.
1 Introduction
Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) [12] is a popular access control model. Rather than
directly assigning users to permissions for using resources, for example via an access control
matrix, in RBAC one introduces a set of roles. The roles are used to decompose a user-
permission relation into two relations: a user-role relation that assigns users to roles and
a role-permission relation that assigns roles to permissions. Since roles are (or should be)
natural abstractions of functional roles within an enterprise, these two relations are concep-
tually easier to work with than a direct assignment of users to permissions. Experience with
RBAC indicates that this decomposition works well in practice and facilitates the adminis-
tration of large-scale authorization policies for enterprises with many thousands of users and
permissions.
Although the benefits of using RBAC are widely recognized, its adoption and adminis-
tration can be problematic in practice. Adoption requires that an enterprise migrates its
authorizations to RBAC. Additionally, even after RBAC is in place, authorizations may need
to be reassigned after major changes within the enterprise, for example, after a reorganization
or a merger where processes and IT systems from different divisions must be consolidated.
Migration and the need to reengineer roles after major changes are the most expensive aspects
of RBAC.
To address these problems, different approaches have been developed to configuring RBAC
systems. These approaches have been classified into two kinds [37]: top-down and bottom-
up role engineering. Top-down engineering configures RBAC independently of any existing
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user-permission assignments by analyzing the enterprise’s business processes and its secu-
rity policies. Bottom-up role-engineering uses existing user-permission assignments to find a
suitable RBAC configuration.
When carried out manually, bottom-up role engineering is very difficult and therefore
incurs high costs and poses security risks. To simplify this step, [24] proposed the first
automatic method for bottom-up role engineering and coined the term role mining for such
methods. Numerous role mining algorithms have been developed since then, notably [9, 35,
26, 31, 38].
Unfortunately, most role mining algorithms suffer from the drawback that the discovered
roles are artificial and unintuitive for the administrators who must assign users to roles. This
undesirable effect is linked to the design principle for role mining algorithms that aim at
achieving one of the following two goals:
• minimizing the deviation between the RBAC configuration and the given access control
matrix for a given number of roles, or
• minimizing the number of roles for a given deviation (possibly zero).
Both goals amount to data compression. As a result, the roles found are often synthetic sets
of permissions. Although these roles minimize the RBAC configuration, they are difficult to
interpret as functional roles, also called business roles, that reflect the business attributes
of the users assigned to them. This shortcoming not only limits the acceptance of the new
RBAC configuration among employees, it also makes the RBAC configuration difficult to
maintain, for example, to update when users join the system or change their business role
within the enterprise. Moreover, by optimizing the roles to fit existing authorizations as close
as possible, existing erroneous user-permission assignments are likely to be migrated to the
new RBAC system. Several attempts have been made to incorporate business attributes into
the role mining process to improve the business-relevance of the roles [29, 18]. However, these
algorithms compress the access control matrix as the underlying objective and they do not
necessarily infer predictive roles.
The problems outlined above arise because the predominant definitions of the role mining
problem [36, 20, 25, 27] do not reflect realistic problem settings. In particular, all prior
definitions assume the existence of input that is usually not available in practice. For example,
the input includes either the number of roles to be found or the maximally tolerable residual
error when fitting the RBAC configuration to the given access-control matrix. Guided by
these definitions, the respective algorithms focus on compressing user-permission assignments
rather than on structured predictions of roles. However, compression addresses the wrong
problems. We argue that there is a need for a definition of role mining as an inference problem
that is based on realistic assumptions. Consequently, given such a definition, algorithms
must be developed that aim at solving this problem. Moreover it is necessary to have quality
measures to compare how well different algorithms solve the problem. Our contributions
cover all these aspects:
• We provide the first complete approach to probabilistic role mining, including the prob-
lem definition, models and algorithms, and quality measures.
• We define role mining as an inference problem: learning the roles that most likely
explain the given data. We carefully motivate and explicate the assumptions involved.
• We propose probabilistic models for finding the RBAC configuration that has most
likely generated a given access-control matrix.
• We demonstrate that the RBAC configuration that best solves the role inference prob-
lem contains roles that generalize well to a set of hold-out users. We therefore provide a
generalization test to evaluate role mining algorithms and apply this test to our methods
and to competing approaches.
• We experimentally demonstrate that our probabilistic approach provides a sound con-
fidence estimate for given user-permission assignments.
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Figure 1: Graphical illustration of the decomposition of an access control matrix X, which
assigns N users to D permissions, into an RBAC configuration with two assignments: Z
assigns users to K roles and U assigns roles to permissions. The reconstruction Z ∗U fits X
up to residuals. The Boolean matrices X, Z, and U encode the relations UPA, UA, and PA,
respectively.
• We develop a hybrid role mining algorithm that incorporates business attributes into
the role mining process and thereby improves the interpretability of roles.
We proceed as follows. First, in Section 2, we review the assumptions that are often
implicitly made for role mining and we use them to define the inference role mining problem
together with appropriate evaluation criteria. Then, in Section 3, we derive a class of proba-
bilistic models from the deterministic user-permission assignment rule of RBAC. We explain
two model instances in detail and we propose learning algorithms for them in Section 4. In
Sections 5, we report on experimental findings on real world access control data. In Section 6,
we show how to include business attributes of the users in the role mining process to obtain
a hybrid role mining algorithm and we experimentally investigate how these attributes in-
fluence the RBAC configurations discovered. We discuss related work in Section 7 and draw
conclusions in Section 8
2 Problem definition
In this section we define the role inference problem. First, we explain the assumptions
underlying our definition. Afterwards we present a general definition of role mining that
takes business-relevant information into account. The pure bottom-up problem without such
information will be a special case of the general problem. Finally, we propose quality measures
for assessing role mining algorithms.
2.1 Assumptions and problem definition
The role mining problem is defined in terms of a set of users USERS, a set of permissions
PRMS, a user-permission assignment relation UPA, a set of roles ROLES, a user-role as-
signment relation UA, a role-permission assignment relation PA, and, if available, top-down
information TDI. Our problem definition is based on three assumptions about the relation-
ships between these entities and the generation process of UPA. All these entities and their
relationships are sketched in Figure 2.
Assumption 1: An underlying RBAC configuration exists We assume that the
given user-permission assignment UPA was induced by an unknown RBAC configuration
RC∗=(ROLES∗, UA∗, PA∗), where “induced” means that UPA ≈ UA∗ ∗PA∗. This assumption
is at the heart of role mining. To search for roles implicitly assumes that they are there to
be found. Said another way, searching for roles in direct assignments between users and
permissions only makes sense if one assumes that parts of the data could, in principle, be
organized in such a structured way. Without this assumption, the role structure that one can
expect to find in a given access-control matrix would be random and therefore meaningless
from the perspective of the enterprise’s business processes and security policies.
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Assumption 2: Top-down information TDI influences the RBAC configuration
RC∗ We assume that RC∗ reflects the enterprise’s security policies and the business pro-
cesses in the sense that RC∗ encodes these policies and enables users to carry out their
business tasks. Full knowledge of the security policies and business processes, as well as
all business attributes and user tasks, should, in principle, determine the system’s user-
permission assignment. We denote all such information as top-down information (TDI); this
name reflects that the task of configuring RBAC using TDI is usually referred to as top-down
role mining. In practice, only parts of TDI may be available to the role mining algorithm. In
Figure 2, we account for this structure by distinguishing “TDI” from “TDI input”. Whenever
some parts of TDI are used in the role mining process we then speak of hybrid-role mining.
Assumption 3: Exceptions exist The observed user-permission assignment UPA might
contain an unknown number of exceptions. An exception is a user-permission assignment that
is not generated by the role-structure RC∗ but rather from a set of unknown perturbation
processes. To capture this assumption in Figure 2, we distinguish the given access control
matrix UPA ≈ UA∗ ∗ PA∗ from an unknown exception-free matrix UPA′ = UA∗ ∗ PA∗ that
is fully determined by the role structure. We emphasize that, even though there are many
ways errors can arise in a system, exceptions are not necessarily errors. Moreover, a role
mining algorithm cannot be expected to discriminate between an error (that is, an unintended
exception) and an intentionally made exception, if additional information is not provided. A
role mining algorithm can identify exceptions and report them to a domain expert (ideally
ranked by their likelihood). Such a procedure already provides a substantial advantage over
manually checking all user-permission pairs as it involves far fewer checks. Due to the lack of
additional information, we abstain from making further assumptions about the exceptions,
for instance the fraction of exceptions δ. Instead, determining such parameters will constitute
an important part of the role mining problem.
We now propose the following definition of the role mining problem.
Definition 1. Role inference problem
Let a set of users USERS, a set of permissions PRMS, a user-permission relation UPA,
and, optionally, parts of the top-down information TDI be given. Under Assumptions 1–3,
infer the unknown RBAC configuration RC∗=(ROLES∗, UA∗, PA∗).
This definition, together with the assumptions on UPA’s generation process, provides
a unified view of bottom-up and hybrid role mining. The two cases only differ in terms
of the availability of top-down information TDI. In hybrid role mining, parts of the top-
down information that influenced RC∗ is available. When TDI is not provided, the problem
reduces to bottom-up role mining. Note that in such cases the goal still remains the same: the
solution to Problem 1 solves the bottom-up problem as well as the hybrid role mining problem.
Thereby, the assumption that RC∗ is (partially) influenced by TDI is also reasonable for the
pure bottom-up role mining problem. Whether TDI actually influences RC∗ does not depend
on the availability of such data.
Figure 2: Dependencies of the entities in-
volved in role mining. This scheme illustrates
how the user-permission assignment UPA is
assumed to be generated. An arrow indicates
the direction of the generation process. Grey
entities are unknown and black ones are given
as input. For pure bottom-up role mining, no
top-down information is given.
Relationship to role mining by compression The role mining problems that aim to
achieve the closest fit for a given compression ratio or achieve the best compression for a
given deviation differ from the role inference problem. Technically, our definition has less
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input than the alternatives. For the above-mentioned problems, either the number of roles
k or the deviation δ is provided as input. In contrast, our definition makes no assumptions
on these quantities and both k and δ must be learned from UPA (as finding RC∗ involves
finding k and, at the same time, determines δ = UPA− UA∗ ∗ PA∗).
Moreover, we see it is an advantage that the assumptions of the problem are explicitly
given. By making the assumption of an underlying role structure a condition for role mining,
our problem definition favors conservative algorithms in the following sense. If little or no
structure exists in UPA, the optimal algorithm should refrain from artificially creating too
many roles from UPA. In contrast, if the number of roles or the closeness of fit is predeter-
mined, optimal algorithms will migrate exceptional (and possibly unwarranted) permissions
to RBAC.
Finally, it is unrealistic in practice that δ or k will be given as an input. Hence, treating
them as unknowns reflects real-world scenarios better than previous definitions for role mining
that require either δ or k as inputs.
2.2 Quality measures
Comparison with true roles The obvious quality measure that corresponds to the role
inference problem is the distance to the hidden RBAC configuration RC∗ underlying the
given data UPA. Several distance metrics for comparing two RBAC configurations exist,
for instance the Hamming distance between the roles or the Jaccard similarity between the
roles. Usually, however, RC∗ is not known in practice. A comparison is possible only for
artificially created user-permission assignments where we know RC∗ or when an existing
RBAC configuration is used to compute a user-permission assignment. We therefore focus in
this paper on quality measures that are applicable to all access control matrices, independent
of knowledge of RC∗.
Generalization error We propose to use generalization error for evaluating RBAC con-
figurations. The generalization error is often used to assess supervised learning methods for
prediction [21]. The generalization error of an RBAC configuration RC that has been learned
from an input dataset X(1) indicates how well RC fits to a second dataset X(2) that has been
generated in the same way as X(1).
Computing the generalization error for an unsupervised learning problem like role mining
is conceptually challenging. In general, it is unclear how to transfer the inferred roles to a
hold-out test dataset when no labels are given that indicate a relationship between roles and
users. We employ a method that can be used for a wide variety of unsupervised learning
problems: the transfer costs proposed in [15]. The transfer costs of a role mining algorithm
are computed as follows. First the input dataset is randomly split along the users into a
training set X(1) and a validation set X(2). Then the role mining algorithm learns the RBAC
configuration RC = (Zˆ, Uˆ) based only on the training set and without any knowledge of
the second hold-out dataset. Having learned RC, the solution is transfered to the hold-out
dataset by using a nearest neighbor mapping between the users of both datasets. Each user
in X(2) is assigned to the set of roles of its nearest neighbor user in X(1). Technically, this
means we keep Uˆ fixed and create a new assignment matrix Z′, where row i is copied from
the row in Zˆ that corresponds to the nearest neighbor user of user i. Then generalization
error is the Hamming distance between Z′ ∗ Uˆ and X(2) divided by the number of entries of
X(2). This ratio denotes the fraction of erroneously generalized assignments.
The rationale behind our measure is intuitive: Since the input dataset is assumed to be
generated by an unknown RBAC configuration RC∗, the subsets X(1) and X(2) have also
been generated by RC∗. The structure of the input matrix is the same in different subsets of
the dataset, but the random exceptional assignments are unique to each user. A role mining
algorithm that can infer RC∗ from one subset, will have a low generalization error because the
generating RBAC configuration should generalize best to the data that it has generated. As
a consequence, a role mining algorithm that overfits to noise patterns in one dataset will fail
to predict the structure of the second dataset. Thereby, even a perfect role mining algorithm
will have a positive generalization error if the data is noisy. It is the relationship to the
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generalization error of other algorithms that counts. All methods fail to predict exceptional
assignments but the better methods will succeed in identifying the structure of the hold-
out data while the inferior methods will compromise the underlying structure to adapt to
exceptions.
An advantage of computing the generalization error as described above is that this com-
putation is agnostic to the role mining algorithm used. In particular it works for both
probabilistic and combinatorial methods. For probabilistic methods one could achieve im-
proved results by using a posterior inference step to assign test users to the roles discovered.
However, this method is tailored to the particular methods employed and would not work for
methods without a probabilistic model.
3 From a deterministic rule to a class of probabilistic
models
In this section we propose a class of probabilistic models for role mining. We derive our core
model from the deterministic assignment rule of RBAC and extend this core model to more
sophisticated models. We will present two such extensions: (1) the disjoint-decomposition
model (DDM) with a two-level role hierarchy where each user has only one role and (2) multi-
assignment clustering (MAC), a flat RBAC model featuring a role relationship where users
can assume multiple roles. We will also show why these two instances of the model class are
particularly relevant for role mining.
3.1 Core model
In the following, we derive the core part of our probabilistic model. We start with the
deterministic rule that assigns users to permissions based on a given role configuration. We
then convert this rule into a probabilistic version, where one reasons about the probability
of observing a particular user-permission assignment matrix given the probabilities of users
having particular roles and roles entailing permissions.
We denote the user-permission assignment matrix by X, with X ∈ {0, 1}N×D. As short-
hand, we write xi∗ for the ith row of the matrix and x∗d for the dth column. We define the
generative process of an assignment xid ∈ {0, 1} by
ukd ∼ p(ukd|βkd) (1)
xid ∼ p(xid|u∗d, zi∗) , (2)
where a ∼ p(a) means that a is a random variable drawn from the probability distribution
p(a). The latent variable ukd ∈ {0, 1} determines permission d ∈ {1, ..., D} of source k ∈
{1, ...,K}. The parameter zik ∈ {0, 1} encodes whether user i is assigned to role k. As ukd is
binary, p(ukd|βkd) is a Bernoulli distribution, with p(ukd = 0) := βkd and
p(ukd|βkd) := β1−ukdkd (1− βkd)ukd . (3)
Throughout this section, we will condition all probabilities on Z. Therefore, we can ignore
p(zik) for the moment and treat it as a model parameter here. In Section 3.3 we will treat
zik as a random variable and describe a particular prior distribution for it.
The generative model that we described so far is illustrated in Figure 3. All entities in this
figure have a well-defined semantic meaning. The circles are random variables. A filled circle
denotes that the variable is observable (like the user-permission assignment xid) and an empty
circle represents a hidden variable. Small solid dots are unknown model parameters. Arrows
indicate statistical dependencies between entities. Whenever an entity is in a rectangle (say
in the N -rectangle and in the D-rectangle) then multiple different realizations of this entity
exist (here N ·D realizations of xid, each with a different index i and d).
The probability p(xid|u∗d, zi∗) is deterministic in the following sense. Given all role-
permission assignments ukd and the role assignments zi∗, the bit xid is determined by the
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Figure 3: Graphical model corre-
sponding to the generation rule of
user-permission assignments given
an RBAC configuration. See the
explanation of the semantics in the
text.
disjunction rule defined by the Boolean matrix product
X = Z ∗U such that xid = f(u∗d, zi∗) :=
K∨
k=1
(zik ∧ ukd) . (4)
To derive the likelihood of xid, we express this deterministic formula xid = f(u∗d, zi∗)
in terms of a probability distribution. To this end, the entire probability mass must be
concentrated at the deterministic outcome, i.e. the distribution must be of the form
p(xid|u∗d, zi∗) =
{
1, if xid = f(u∗d, zi∗)
0, otherwise
. (5)
A probability distribution that fulfills this requirement is
p(xid|u∗d, zi∗) =
(∏
k
(1− ukd)zik
)(1−xid)(
1−
∏
k
(1− ukd)zik
)xid
. (6)
This can be seen by going through all eight combinations (for a single k) of the binary
values of zik, xid, and ukd. The distribution reflects that there are only two possible outcomes
of this random experiment. In the following, we exploit this property and work just with
probabilities for xid = 0. The probability for xid = 1 is always the remaining probability
mass.
The model in its current deterministic state is not directly useful for role mining given the
hidden variables ukd. We therefore eliminate the ukd to obtain a likelihood that only depends
on the model parameters and the observations. This can be achieved by marginalizing out
ukd, i.e., summing over all possible K×D matrices u. As derived in Appendix A.1, this yields
the likelihood p(xid = 0|β∗d, zi∗) =
∏
k β
zik
kd . This term reflects that if a user is not assigned
to a role, then the role does not have any influence on the user’s permissions. Therefore, the
chance of a user not being assigned some permission d′ decreases with the number of roles of
the user, since the chances βkd′ of d
′ not being assigned to the roles are multiplied.
As xid can only take two possible values, we have p(xid = 1|β∗d, zi∗) = 1−
∏
k β
zik
kd such
that the full likelihood of the bit xid is
p(xid|β∗d, zi∗) =
(∏
k
βzikkd
)1−xid (
1−
∏
k
βzikkd
)xid
. (7)
According to this likelihood, the different entries in X are conditionally independent given
the parameters Z and β. Therefore, the complete data likelihood factorizes over users and
permissions: p(X|β,Z) = ∏Ni=1∏Dd=1 p(xid|β∗d, zi∗).
3.2 Role hierarchies
In this section we extend the core model by introducing role hierarchies. The core model
provides a hierarchy of depth 1 as there is only one level of roles. We introduce an additional
level, resulting in a hierarchy of depth 2. The meaning of the hierarchical relationship is
as follows. Roles in the second layer can be sub-roles of roles in the first layer. The set of
permissions for a super-role includes all permissions of its sub-roles.
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Our derivation is generic in that it can be used to add extra layers to a hierarchical
model. By repeated application, one can derive probabilistic models with hierarchies of any
depth. As we will see, the one-level hierarchy (flat RBAC) and the two-level hierarchy are
particularly interesting. In Section 3.3 we propose a model variant for flat RBAC and a
model variant with a two-level hierarchy.
Like the core model, the hierarchical model derived here is not restricted to role mining.
However, we will motivate its usefulness of hierarchies by practical considerations in access-
control. We assume that there exists a decomposition of the set of users into partially
overlapping groups: Users are assigned to one or more groups by a Boolean assignment
matrix Z. Each row i represents a user and the columns k represent user-groups. In practice,
such a decomposition may be performed by an enterprise’s Human Resources Department,
for example, by assigning users to enterprise divisions according to defined similarities of
the employees. If such data is lacking, then the decomposition may just be given by the
differences in the assigned permissions for each user. For simplicity, the matrix Z has the
same notation as in the last section.
We now introduce a second layer. We assume that there is a decomposition of the permis-
sions such that every permission belongs to one or more permission-groups. These member-
ships are expressed by the Boolean assignment matrix Y. Here the lth row of Y represents
the permission-group l and the dth column is the permission d. The assignment of permissions
to permission-groups can be motivated by the technical similarities of the resources that the
permissions grant access to. For example, in an object-oriented setting, permissions might
be grouped that execute methods in the same class. Alternatively, permissions could be cat-
egorized based on the risk that is associated with granting someone a particular permission.
Of course, permissions can also be grouped according to the users who own them.
We denote user-groups by business roles whereas we call permission-groups technical
roles. Business roles are assigned to technical roles. We represent these assignments by a
matrix V. To keep track of all introduced variables, we list the types of the above-mentioned
Boolean assignment matrices:
• Users i to permissions d: xid∈{0, 1}, where i∈{1, ...,N} , d∈{1, ...,D}.
• Users i to business roles k: zik ∈ {0, 1}, where k ∈ {1, ...,K}.
• Business roles k to technical roles l: vkl ∈ {0, 1}, where l ∈ {1, ..., L}.
• Technical roles l to permissions d: yld ∈ {0, 1}.
Throughout this section, the indices i, d, k, and l have the above scope and are used to index
the above items.
Starting with this additional layer of roles, one can recover a flat hierarchy by collapsing
the role-role assignment matrix and the role-permission assignments using the disjunction
rule ukd =
∨
l vkl ∧ yld. Thereby, U can be understood as the role-permission assignment
matrix from the last section. With this structure, the final N×D user-permission assignment
matrix X is determined by two Boolean matrix products
X = Z ∗U = Z ∗V ∗Y with xid =
∨
k
[
zik ∧
(∨
l
vkl ∧ yld
)]
. (8)
Equation 8 expresses when a user i is assigned to permission d. There exists one Boolean
matrix product per role layer. Note that for a given RBAC configuration, we can also partially
collapse hierarchies. In particular, this makes sense when a business role is directly linked to
permissions. We are again interested in the probability of such an assignment. Starting from
this logical expression, we derive below how likely it is to observe an assignment of a user i
to a permission d.
The deterministic assignment rule for two layers of roles is graphically illustrated in Fig-
ure 4(a): a user is assigned to a permission if there is at least one path in the graph connecting
them. As this figure indicates, a user can be assigned to a permission in multiple ways, that
is, there may be multiple paths. It is therefore easier to express how a user may not be
assigned to a permission (we denote this by ¬x := x) rather than computing the union over
all possible assignment paths. Also, we will abbreviate parameters by z+ :=p(z=1) and, for
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independent variables, z+i∗ :={z+i1, ..., z+iK}.
p
(
xid |z+i∗,y+∗d, V +
)
= p
 K∨
k=1
[
zik ∧
(
L∨
l=1
vkl ∧ yld
)]
|z+i∗,y+∗d, V +
 (9)
As shown in Appendix A.2, this probability is
p
(
xid |z+i∗,y+∗d, V +
)
=
∏
k
(
1− z+ik + z+ik
∏
l
(
1− y+ld) + y+ld(1− v+kl)
))
. (10)
We condition this expression on the binary entries of Y and Z.
p(xid | zi∗,y∗d, v+kl) =
∏
k
11−zik ·
(∏
l
(1− v+kl)
yld · 11−yld
)zik
=
∏
k,l
(1− v+kl)
zikyld
(11)
As this expression is independent of other matrix entries in X, we can express the complete
likelihood of the user-permission assignment matrix given the business roles and technical
roles as a product over users and permissions.
p (X |Z,Y) =
∏
i,d
[
1− p(xid | zi∗,y∗d, v+kl)
]xid [
p(xid | zi∗,y∗d, v+kl)
]1−xid
=
∏
i,d
1−∏
k,l
(1− v+kl)
zikyld
xid ∏
k,l
(1− v+kl)
zikyld
1−xid (12)
If we treat vkl as a random variable with probability p(vkl = 0) = (1− v+kl), then this
likelihood resembles the one with only one layer of roles. The only differences are the addi-
tional binary variables yld in the exponent that, like zik, can switch off individual terms of
the product. Thereby, we chose to condition on Y and Z and leave vkl random. We could
as well have conditioned on V and Z and inferred yld. This alternative points to a generic
inference strategy for role hierarchies of arbitrary size. One treats the assignment variables
in one layer as a random variable and conditions on the current state of the others. We will
demonstrate such an alternating inference scheme on a two level hierarchy in Section 3.3.
3.3 Overparametrization and instantiation by introducing constraints
The above model of user-permission assignments defines a very general framework. In princi-
ple, one can iteratively introduce additional layers in the role hierarchy without substantially
changing the outer form of the likelihood. In the derivations, we have avoided any prior
assumptions on the probabilities of the entries of V, Y, and Z. We have only exploited the
fact that these variables are Booleans and, therefore, only take the values 0 or 1. We have
also avoided any assumptions about the processes that lead to a particular decomposition of
the set of users and the set of permissions. Moreover, we have not specified any constraints on
the user decomposition, the permission decomposition, or the assignments from user-groups
to permission-groups.
It turns out that the model with a two-level hierarchy already has more degrees of free-
dom than is required to represent the access control information present in many domains
that arise in practice. In particular, when only the data X is given, there is no information
available on how to decompose the second role level. This lack of identifiability becomes
obvious when we think about a one-level decomposition with role-permission assignments U
(as in Eq. (4)) and try to convert it into a two-level decomposition. The Z,U decomposition
has already sufficiently many degrees of freedom to fit any binary matrix. Further decom-
posing U into an extra layer of roles V and assignments from these roles to permissions Y is
arbitrary when there does not exist additional information or constraints. Therefore, the flat
RBAC configuration with only one role layer is the most relevant one. The two-level hierar-
chy without constraints is over-parameterized. Such a hierarchy can be seen as a template
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Figure 4: Illustration of the structure of three model instances. A user has a permission if
there is at least one path connecting them. a) Full model. b) Model with trivial decomposition
of the permissions (flat RBAC). c) Disjoint Decomposition Model with only one business role
per user and one technical role per permission.
for an entire class of models. By introducing constraints, we can instantiate this template
to specialized models that fit the requirements of particular RBAC environments and have
a similar model complexity as flat RBAC without constraints. These instances of the model
class are given by augmenting unconstraint two-level RBAC with assumptions on the proba-
bility distributions of the binary variables and giving constraints on the variables themselves.
In the following, we will present two relevant model instances and explain their relationship.
Later, we will extend the models with generation processes for exceptional assignments.
Flat RBAC
In this model, each permission is restricted to be a member of only one permission-group and
each permission-group can contain only a single permission. Formally:
(
∀l : ∑j yld = 1) ∧
(∀j : ∑l yld = 1). The conditioned likelihood then becomes
pflat (X |Z) =
∏
i,d
[
1−
∏
k
p(vkd)
zik
]xid [∏
k
p(vkd)
zik
]1−xid
. (13)
This “collapsed” model is equivalent to flat RBAC without constraints. This can be seen
by renaming v by u and J by D. As each technical role serves as a proxy for exactly one
permission, we have D = J anyway. A graphical representation of the structure of this model
instance is given in Figure 4(b). Equivalently, we could introduce one-to-one constraints on
the user role assignment and collapse Z instead of Y, leading to a model with the same
structure.
Disjoint decomposition model (DDM)
This model has even stronger constraints. Namely, kmax = 1 and the number of assigned
permission-groups per permission is limited to lmax = 1. This formalizes that each user
belongs to exactly one user-group and each permission belongs to exactly one permission-
group. Hence, both users and permissions are respectively partitioned into disjoint business
roles and technical roles. A disjoint decomposition substantially reduces the complexity of
a two-level hierarchy while still retaining a high degree of flexibility since users of a given
user-group may still be assigned to multiple permission-groups. We illustrate this model in
Figure 4(c).
3.4 Prior assumptions on probabilities
A central question in role mining is how many roles are required to explain a given dataset. In
this paper, we take two different approaches to determining the number of roles k. For the flat
RBAC model, we treat k as a fixed model parameter. One must therefore repeatedly run the
algorithm optimizing this model for different k and select the result according to an external
measure. In our experiments, we will tune the number of roles k by cross-validation using the
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generalization error as the external quality measure. For DDM with a two-level hierarchy,
we explicitly include prior assumptions on the number of roles into the model using a non-
parametric Bayesian approach. This way, the role mining algorithm can internally select the
number of roles.
Instead of directly providing the number of roles for DDM, we only assume that, given an
RBAC configuration with roles and user-role assignments, the a priori probability of a new
user being assigned to one of the roles depends linearly on the number of users having this
role (plus a nonzero probability of creating a new role). This assumption reflects that it is
favorable to assign a new user to existing roles instead of creating new roles when users enter
the enterprise. This rich-get-richer effect indirectly influences the number of roles as, under
this assumption, an RBAC configuration with few large roles (large in the number of users)
is more likely than a configuration with many small roles.
Our assumption is modeled by a Dirichlet process prior [1, 11]. Let N be the total number
of users and let Nk be the number of users that have role k (the cardinality of the role). The
Dirichlet process is parametrized by the nonnegative concentration parameter α.
p (zi′k = 1|Zi 6=i′ , α) =
{
Nk
N−1+α Nk > 0
α
N−1+α Nk = 0
(14)
Here, we used the short-hand notation Zi 6=i′ for the role assignments of all users except (the
hypothetically new) user i′. The event where user i′ is assigned a role with N = 0 corresponds
to creating a new role with exactly the permissions of i′.
The business-role to permission-role assignments are distributed according to a Bernoulli
distribution p (vkl | Z,Y,β) = β1−vklkl (1− βkl)vkl . Again, the model parameter βkl accounts
for the probability that the assignment is not active. We introduce a symmetric Beta prior
for βkl:
Pb (βkl; γ, γ) :=
Γ(2γ)
2Γ(γ)
(βkl(1− βkl))γ−1 = B(γ, γ)−1 (βkl(1− βkl))γ−1 , (15)
where B(., .) and Γ(.) are the beta function and the gamma function, respectively. We derive
the update equations for a Gibbs sampler on this model in Appendix A.3.
With the Dirichlet process prior on the user-role and the role-permission assignments and
the Beta-Bernoulli likelihood, DDM is equivalent to the “infinite relational model” (IRM)
proposed in [23]. We will use a similar Gibbs-sampling algorithm to infer the model param-
eters of DDM as used in [23]. While [23] use hill climbing to infer the model parameters, we
repeatedly sample the parameters from the respective probabilities and keep track of the most
likely parameters. We graphically illustrate the model with all introduced prior assumptions
in Figure 5. There, we use different hyperparameters α1 and α2 for the assignments Z and
Y. However, in all calculations we use the same hyperparameters α = α1 = α2.
Figure 5: Graphical model for DMM
with prior distributions. Filled cir-
cles are observed random variables
and empty circles are hidden. Solid
points denote fixed parameters of
the model. Arrows indicate depen-
dencies. Entities on a N -rectangle
exist in N different realizations.
Nonparametric Bayesian priors could, in principle, also be added to the flat RBAC model
proposed above. However, as this model allows users to have multiple roles, the Dirichlet
process prior is not applicable to Z. Instead, the “Indian Buffet Process” [19] could be used
as a prior. In our experiments, we compare with an algorithm that combines such a prior
with a noisy-OR likelihood [39].
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3.5 Noise
The goal of role mining is to infer the role structure underlying a given access control matrix.
In this context, structure means permissions that are frequently assigned together and users
that share the same set of permissions (not necessarily all their permissions). User-permission
assignments that do not replicate over the users do not account for the structure. We call
such exceptional assignments noise. A noisy bit can be an unusual permission or a missing
assignment of a permission.
In this section we add an explicit noise process to the flat RBAC model. Let xSid be
a “structural” bit and let xNid be a “noise” bit. While a structural bit is generated by the
generation process of the user-permission assignments in the flat RBAC scenario given by
Eq. (13), a noise bit is generated by a random coin flip with probability r:
pN
(
xNid | r
)
= rx
N
id (1− r)1−xNid . (16)
Let ξSid be a binary variable indicating if the observed bit xid is a noise bit or a structure
bit. Then the observed bit is
xid = (1− ξid)xSid + ξidxNid . (17)
With the structure and noise distribution combined, the resulting probability of an ob-
served xid is
p(xid | Li,β, r, ξid)=pN (xid | r)ξid pS(xid | Li,β)1−ξid . (18)
In Appendix A.4 we marginalize out ξ and obtain the final likelihood of this model.
pMAC (X |Z,β, r, ) =
∏
id
( · pN (xid | r) + (1− ) · pflat (xid |Z,β)) . (19)
The generation process underlying this model is depicted in Figure 6. The advantage of an ex-
plicit noise process over threshold-based denoising methods [4] is the ability to automatically
adapt to the data’s noise level. Another way to deal with noise is denoising in the continuous
domain as a preprocessing step for a generic role mining method. Such an approach using
SVD has shown good performance [31]. While this step is computationally inexpensive, it
requires selecting a cutoff threshold.
Figure 6: The generative
model of Boolean MAC
with mixture noise. Li
is the assignment set of
user i, indicating which
roles from U generated the
user’s permissions. The
bit ξid selects whether the
noise-free bit xSid or the
noise bit xNid is observed.
This model is an extension
of the model in Fig. 3.
4 Learning the model parameters
In the last section we derived a class of probabilistic models. To apply these models to the
role mining problem, we require algorithms that learn the model parameters from a given
access control matrix. In this section we present two such learning algorithms. In particular,
we use an annealed version of expectation-maximization (EM) for the models with a fixed
number of parameters and Gibbs sampling for the non-parametric model variants.
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4.1 Annealed EM
When applying the well-known EM algorithm to clustering problems, one alternates between
updating the expected cluster assignments given the current centroids (E-step) and updating
the centroids given the current assignments (M-step). In the case of the proposed model for
multi-assignment clustering (MAC), the E-step computes the expected assignment γL,i of a
user i to role set L for each role and each user:
γL,i = p(L|X,β, , r)1/T
( |L|∑
L=1
p(L|X,β, , r)1/T
)−1
. (20)
Here, we have introduced the computational temperature T > 0. The case with T = 1
reproduces the conventional E-step. The limit T → ∞ yields the uniform distribution over
all role sets and a low temperature T → 0 makes the expectation of the assignments “crisp”
(close to 0 or 1). The normalization ensures that the sum over all L ∈ L equals 1.
While iterating this modified E-step and the conventional M-step, we decrease the tem-
perature starting from a value of the order of the negative log-likelihood costs. As a result,
the local minima of the cost function are less apparent in the early stage of the optimization.
In this way, lower minima can be identified than with conventional EM, although there is
no guarantee of finding the global minimum. In addition to this robustness effect of the
annealing scheme, we obtain the desired effect that, in the low-temperature regime of the
optimization, the user-role assignments are pushed towards 0 and 1. As we are ultimately
interested in binary user-role assignments, we benefit from forcing the model to make crisp
decisions.
We provide the update equations of all model parameters used in the M-step in Ap-
pendix A.5. The rows of β are initialized with random rows of 1−X and (, r) are initialized
with (0.1, 0.5). The annealed optimization is stopped when the last user was assigned to a
single role set with a probability exceeding 1− 10−6.
4.2 Gibbs sampling
For nonparametric model variants as, for instance, the DDM with a Dirichlet process for
the user-role assignments, we employ Gibbs sampling to learn the model parameters. Gibbs
sampling iteratively samples the assignment of a user to one of the currently existing roles or
to a new role while keeping the assignments of all other users fixed. This scheme explicitly
exploits the exchangeability property of these models. This property states that the ordering
in which new objects are randomly added to the clusters does not affect the overall distribution
over all clusterings.
All terms involved in the sampling step are derived in Appendix A.3. The probability
for assigning the current user to a particular role is given in Eq. (52). The Gibbs sampler
alternates between iterating over all user-role assignments and over all permission-role as-
signments. It stops if the assignments do not change significantly over several consecutive
iterations or if a predefined maximum number of alternations is reached. While running
the sampler, the algorithm stores the state with the maximum a-posteriori probability and
reports this state as the output. This book-keeping leads to worse scores than computing the
estimated score by averaging over the entire chain of sampled RBAC configurations. How-
ever, this restriction to a single solution reflects the practical constraints of the role mining
problem. Ultimately, the administrator must choose a single RBAC configuration.
5 Experiments
In this section we experimentally investigate the proposed models on both artificial and real-
world datasets. We start by comparing MAC and DDM on datasets where we vary the
noise level. Afterwards we compare MAC and DDM with other methods for Boolean matrix
factorization on a collection of real-world datasets.
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Figure 7: Comparison of the generalization error of MAC and DDM on data generated from
a DDM role hierarchy and a flat RBAC configuration respectively.
5.1 Comparison of MAC and DDM
MAC and DDM originate from the same core model. However, they differ in the following
respects: First, DDM has one extra layer of roles. This additional layer, encoded in the
assignment matrix Y, creates a clustering of the permissions. Therefore, DDM has a two-
level role hierarchy while MAC models flat RBAC. Second, DDM has additional constraints
on its assignment matrices Z and Y dictating that the business roles must be disjoint in
terms of their users and the technical roles must be disjoint in terms of their permissions.
The assignments of business roles to technical roles V are unconstrained. MAC has no
constraints at all. A user can have multiple roles and permissions can be assigned to multiple
roles. The last difference between the two models are the prior assumptions on the model
parameters. While MAC implicitly assumes uniform prior probabilities for its parameters,
DDM makes explicit non-uniform assumptions encoded in the Beta priors and the Dirichlet
priors.
To evaluate which of the two model variants is best suited to solve the role mining problem,
we design the following experiment. We generate access control data in two different ways.
One half of the datasets is generated according to the MAC model. We take a set of roles and
randomly assign users to role combinations to create a user-permission assignment matrix.
Then, we randomly select a defined fraction of matrix entries and replace them with the
outcome of a fair coin flip. Some users in these datasets are generated by multiple roles.
The second set of datasets is generated from the DDM probability distribution by repeatedly
sampling business roles and technical roles from the Dirichlet process priors and randomly
connecting them according to the Beta-Bernoulli probabilities.
On both kinds of data sets, we infer RBAC configurations with DDM and with MAC. In
this way, the model assumptions always hold for one of the models while the other one operates
in a model-mismatch situation. Moreover, data from DDM can have an arbitrary number of
underlying roles. Therefore, MAC requires an additional model-order selection mechanism.
Cross-validation with the generalization test described in Section 2.2 is employed as a quality
measure.
We control the difficulty of the experiments by varying the noise level in the data. For
each noise level, we sample 30 datasets from each model variant, each with 400 users and 50
permissions. On each dataset, we run each model 10 times and select the solution with the
highest internal quality score, respectively. Finally, we evaluate the inferred roles based on
their generalization error on a hold-out test set.
Results We report the median generalization error of the inferred matrix decompositions
and the 25%/75%-percentiles in Figure 7. The left plot depicts the generalization error on
DDM data and the right plot shows the error on MAC data.
We see that the overall trend of both models is similar for both types of data. The
generalization error increases with increasing noise. There are two explanations for this
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behavior. First, the problem of estimating the structure of the data becomes increasingly
difficult when increasing the noise level. Second, noisy bits are likely to be wrongly predicted,
even when the data structure is learned well.
We also see that MAC and DDM generalize almost equally well on DMM data. MAC
is even slightly better than DDM. In contrast, DMM achieves a worse generalization error
than MAC on MAC data in the intermediate noise range. One would expect that each model
generalizes best on data that is generated according to its assumptions. This behavior can be
observed on MAC data. However, on DDM data MAC is as good as DDM. The reason is that
for DMM data, the model assumptions of MAC are in fact not violated. Even though DMM
has an extra layer of roles, this model instance is less complex than flat RBAC (which MAC
models). One can see this by collapsing one DDM layer. For instance, define u′ := v ∗ y.
Then permissions can be assigned to multiple roles (because there are no constraints on the
business-role to technical-role assignment v). At the same time, z still provides a disjoint
clustering of the users. In this flat RBAC configuration (z,u′) the roles overlap in terms of
their permissions but not in terms of the users that are assigned to the roles. The same model
structure arises in single-assignment clustering (SAC), a constrained variant of MAC, where
users can have only one role. As a consequence, we can interpret DDM as a SAC model
with prior probabilities on the model parameters. In contrast to MAC, SAC yields inferior
parameter estimates as it must fit more model parameters for the same complexity of data.
Hence, it has a larger generalization error.
In contrast to the structural difference between DDM and MAC, the differences in the
optimization algorithm and in the Bayesian priors have only a minor influence on the results.
It appears that MAC can compensate for a missing internal mechanism for finding the appro-
priate number of roles when an external validation step is provided. Also, the Gibbs sampling
scheme and the deterministic annealing algorithm perform equally well on the DDM data.
Given that the prior Beta distributions for the Bernoulli variables of the DDM provide no
improvement over MAC, it seems unnecessary to extend MAC with such priors.
We experimentally confirmed that MAC is a more general model than DDM. We also
found that the generalization error provides a good criterion for selecting the number of roles
without making explicit prior assumptions on the distribution of this number. We therefore
recommend using the MAC model for role mining with real-world datasets.
5.2 Noise
In this section we focus on erroneous user permission assignments. As explained in Section 2.1,
the user-permission assignment matrix UPA given as an input to the role mining problem
contains exceptional or erroneous entries, which we refer to as noise. More precisely, we
assume that a hidden noiseless assignment UPA′ exists, but only UPA, a noisy version of
it, is observable. By inferring a role structure RC = (z,u) that supposedly underlies the
input matrix UPA, our probabilistic models approximately reconstruct the noiseless matrix
as zˆ ∗ uˆ. In synthetic experiments, one can compare this reconstruction against the noise-
free assignment UPA′. We investigate two questions. First, how conservative are the RBAC
configurations that our algorithms find, that is, how many new errors are introduced in the
reconstruction? Second, does the probabilistic approach provide a measure of confidence for
reconstructed user-permission assignments?
Figure 8 depicts error rates that provide answers to both questions. In Figure 8a we
contrast the fraction of wrong reconstruction assignments that are new with the fraction
of wrong input assignments that have not been discovered. To obtain these values, we ran
experiments on input matrices created from the DDM with a fraction of randomized bits that
varies from 5% to 75%. As can be seen, MAC’s ratio of newly introduced to repeated errors
is constant for false negatives and false positives alike. DDM tends towards repeating old
errors and introduces fewer new errors, while the sum of new and old errors is approximately
the same as for MAC. The maximal sum of error rates is 8% false negatives and 7.5% false
positives, which is small compared to the maximal fraction of random bits 75%.
Figure 8b illustrates the empirical probability that a reconstructed user-permission as-
signment is wrong. The x-axis is the posterior probability of the true value p(x′id|RC) of this
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Figure 8: Error analysis. 8a: How many new errors are added to the assignment versus how
many original errors were not identified? We distinguish false negatives from false positives.
8b: Trend of the empirical chance of creating a wrong assignment xid as a function of the
posterior probability of the correct assignment given the learned RBAC configuration. It is
apparent that the posterior provides a measure of confidence.
assignment, i.e. the probability of reconstructing the assignment correctly as computed by
the learned model. The plot convincingly illustrates that the posterior provides a measure of
confidence. The stronger the model prefers a particular assignment (the closer the posterior
is to 1), the less likely it is to introduce an error if one follows this preference. This model
property means that, in addition to the RBAC configuration, our algorithms can output a
confidence score for each resulting user-permission assignment. This uncertainty estimate
could help practitioners when configuring RBAC using our methods.
5.3 Experiments on real-world data
In this section we compare MAC and DDM with other Boolean matrix factorization tech-
niques on real-world datasets.
The first dataset LE-access comes from a Large Enterprise. It consists of the user-
permission assignment matrix of N = 4900 users and D = 1300 permissions as well as
business attributes for each user. In this section, we will ignore the business attributes but
in Section 6 we will include them in a hybrid role mining process. The other datasets are six
publicly available datasets from HP labs [9]. They come from different systems and scenarios.
The dataset dominos is an access-control matrix from a Lotus Domino server, customer is
the access-control matrix of an HP customer, americas small and emea are access-control
configurations from Cisco firewalls, and firewall1 and firewall2 are created from policies
of Checkpoint firewalls.
We compare several algorithms for Boolean matrix factorization on these datasets. In
addition to DDM and MAC, there are two other probabilistic methods that have been de-
veloped in different contexts. Binary Independent Component Analysis (BICA) [22] learns
binary vectors that can be combined to fit the data. These vectors, representing the roles in
our setting, are orthogonal, that is, each permission can be assigned to only one role. In [39],
an Indian buffet process has been combined with a noisy-OR likelihood to a nonparamet-
ric model that learns a Boolean matrix factorization. We call this model infinite noisy-OR
(INO). The noisy-OR likelihood is closely related to the likelihood of MAC. The difference is
that its noisy bits are always flipped to 1, whereas in MAC a noisy bit is a random variable
that is 1 with probability r and 0 otherwise. Similar to the Dirichlet process used in DDM,
the Indian buffet process in INO is capable of learning the number of factors (here the num-
ber of roles). Another method that we compare with is a greedy combinatorial optimization
of a matrix factorization cost function. This method, called Discrete Basis Problem solver
(DBPS), was proposed in [28]. It finds a Boolean matrix decomposition that minimizes the
distance between the input matrix and the Boolean matrix product of the two decomposition
matrices. This distance weights false 1s differently compared to false 0s, with weighting fac-
tors that must be selected. The decomposition is successively created by computing a large
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set of candidate vectors (here candidate roles) and then greedily selecting one after the other
such that in each step the distance function is minimized.
For each dataset, we randomly subsample a training set containing 80% of the users and
a hold-out test set containing the remaining 20% users. All model parameters are trained
on the training set and the generalization error is evaluated on the test set. We repeat this
procedure five times with a different random partitioning of the training set and the test set.
We train the model parameters as follows. DDM and INO select the number of roles
internally via the Dirichlet process and the Indian Buffet process, respectively. For MAC,
BICA, and DBPS, we repeatedly split the training data into random subsets and compute
the validation error. We then select the number of roles (and other parameters for BICA and
DBPS, such as thresholds and weighting factors) with lowest validation error and train again
on the entire training set using this number.
Table 1: Results on HP labs data
customer americas small
10,021 users × 277 perms. 3,477 users × 1,587 perms.
k gen. error [%] run-time [min] k gen. error [%] run-time [min]
MAC 187 2.40± 0.03 49 139 1.03± 0.01 80
DDM 4.6 1.90± 0.01 800 48.8 1.00± 0.03 2000
DBPS 178 2.54± 0.05 43 105 1.00± 0.03 100
INO 20 7.8 ± 1.6 990 65.6 1.05± 0.01 300
BICA 82 2.66± 0.02 200 63 1.00± 0.01 64
firewall1 firewall2
365 users × 709 perms. 325 users × 590 perms.
k gen. error [%] run-time [min] k gen. error [%] run-time [min]
MAC 49 4.57± 0.01 10 10 3.40± 0.00 1.8
DDM 24 4.52± 0.01 38 9.6 11.28± 0.00 5.4
DBPS 21 13.6 ± 3.1 5 4 19.5 ± 4.4 2
INO 38.2 8.04± 0.00 96 6.2 11.15± 0.00 14
BICA 18 12.8 ± 3.0 2.1 4 19.9 ± 4.5 0.9
dominos emea
79 users × 231 perms. 35 users × 3,046 perms.
k gen. error [%] run-time [min] k gen. error [%] run-time [min]
MAC 7 1.73± 0.00 1.1 3 8.7 ± 1.2 0.7
DDM 6.4 1.70± 0.01 2.4 18.2 8.4 ± 0.1 143
DBPS 9 2.3 ± 0.5 0.2 8 7.3 ± 2.6 1.1
INO 26 1.7 ± 0.1 9.0 80.4 10.1 ± 2.4 204
BICA 3 1.9 ± 0.3 0.1 5 8.6 ± 2.8 1.0
Our experimental findings on the HP datasets are summarized in Table 9. We report the
number of users and permissions and scores for each method: the number of roles discovered,
the median generalization error and its average difference to the 25% and 75%-percentiles, and
the the time required for one run. For americas small and emea the errors of all methods are
within the percentiles. For customer, DDM generalizes best. For firewall1 and dominos,
DDM and MAC perform equally well and lead the ranking, whereas for firewall2 DDM is
inferior to MAC. While for all datasets MAC finds solutions with an error close to the solutions
of the “winner”, DDM deviates largely from the best method in the case of firewall2.
All methods differ significantly in runtime with DBPS always being the fastest method.
However, the run-times are difficult to compare for several reasons. First, all algorithms have
been implemented by different authors in different programming languages. Second, they all
use different stopping criteria. We manually selected these criteria such that each method
achieves good results on training data, but it is impossible to tune them for a fair runtime
comparison. Finally, all algorithms, except for INO and DDM, must be run several times to
search for appropriate parameters. The runtimes reported in Table 1 account for one such
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Figure 9: Generalization error on real-world data.
run. To find the appropriate k for MAC, DBPs, and BICA, we start with k = 2 and increase
k until the generalization error significantly increases. The final value of k given in Table 1
is thus indicative of the number of runs. For DBPs, we additionally tuned the parameters
“threshold” and “bonuses” with a grid search over 25 candidate values.
The results on LE-access are graphically illustrated in Figure 9. The MAC model general-
izes best. The two nonparametric Bayesian models DDM and INO have a similar performance.
DBPS performs a bit worse and BICA has the highest generalization error. Apparently, on
this dataset, the assumption of orthogonal roles does not hold.
6 Hybrid role mining
Hybrid role mining accepts as input additional information on the attributes of the users
or business processes. The goal, as defined by the inference role mining problem, remains
unchanged: Find the RBAC configuration that most likely underlies the observed user-
permission assignment. As this configuration is assumed to reflect the business properties
and the security policies of the enterprise, we approach the hybrid role mining problem by
jointly fitting an RBAC configuration to the user-permission assignment and to the business
information given as additional input.
We account for this additional information by modifying the optimization problem for
role mining. The original problem is to minimize the negative log-likelihood for the MAC
model (19). The original cost function is
R(ll) =
∑
i,L
ziLR
(ll)
i,L , ziL ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i :
∑
L
ziL = 1 . (21)
Here we used the assignments ziL from user i to the set of roles L. With these assignments
and with the assignments zLk from role sets to roles, a user is assigned the roles, which are
contained in the role set that he is assigned to (zik =
∑
L ziLzLk). The individual costs of
assigning a user i to the set of roles L is
R
(ll)
i,L = − log
(∏
d
pM (xid | L, β, r, )
)
. (22)
We now add an additional term to this negative log-likelihood cost function to define an
objective function for hybrid role mining. We use a linear combination of the likelihood costs
Eq. (21) and a term R(S) that accounts for business information costs:
R := R(ll)/D + λR(S) , (23)
where λ ≥ 0 weights the influence of the business information. The term 1/D makes the
likelihood costs independent of the number of permissions D.
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Role mining without business information is a special case of Eq (23), where λ = 0,
whereby role mining optimizes the model parameters with respect to Eq. (21). This problem
has a huge solution space, spanned by the model parameters, with many local minima. By
incorporating business information into this optimization problem (λ > 0), we introduce a
bias toward minima that correspond to the business attributes used as additional input.
We consider an RBAC configuration to be meaningful if employees satisfying identical
business predicates (that is, having the same business attributes) are also assigned to similar
(ideally identical) sets of roles. To account for this, we propose an objective function R(S)
that computes the similarity of the role assignments of all pairs of users with the same
business attributes. R(S) compares all pairs of users (i, i′) having the business attribute s
with respect to their role assignments (zi·, zi′·). Let wis ∈{0, 1} encode whether user i has
business attribute s (wis = 1) or not (wis = 0). Then the cost of a user-role assignment
matrix Z is
R(S) =
1
N
∑
s
∑
i,i′
wiswi′s
∑
k
zi′k (1− 2zi′kzik) . (24)
N is the total number of users and k ∈ {1, . . . ,K} is the role index. Each user has a single
business attribute s, that is
∑
s wis = 1, but can be assigned to multiple roles, 1 ≤
∑
k zik ≤
K. The term
∑
k zi′k (1− 2zi′kzik) in Eq. (24) computes the agreement between the binary
assignment vectors (zi·, zi′·) for all pairs of users (i, i′) having the same attribute s (which
is the case iff wiswi′s = 1). The subterm 1 − 2zi′kzik switches the sign of a single term
such that agreements (zikzi′k = 1) are rewarded and differences (zikzi′k = 0) are penalized.
An alternative to Eq. (24) would be to compute the Hamming distance between the two
assignment vectors. However, this has the drawback of penalizing pairs with differently sized
role sets. We have chosen the dissimilarity function in Eq. (24) to avoid a bias towards equally
sized role sets.
Note that our objective function conceptually differs from those proposed in [3, 29, 30, 40].
While we minimize the role dispersion of users with the same attributes, their objective is
to minimize measures of attribute dispersion [40] of users with the same roles. We see two
advantages of our cost function. First, it enables multiple groups of users with different
attributes to share roles, such as users of all organizational units getting a “standard role”.
Second, it is easier to add new users in our framework as usually the attributes of new users
are given whereas the roles are not.
Optimization
We now demonstrate how to optimize the new cost function for hybrid role mining using
the deterministic annealing framework presented in Section 4. Specifically, we convert the
term R(S) into a form that enables us to conveniently compute the responsibilities γiL in the
E-step.
The responsibility γiL of the assignment-set L for data item i is given by
γiL :=
exp (−RiL/T )∑
L′∈L exp (−RiL′/T )
. (25)
In Eq. (20), the individual cost terms were RiL = − log (p(x∗i|Li,β, , r)). Now the full
costs are extended with R(S). To compute Eq. (25), we shall rewrite R(S) as a sum over the
individual contributions of the users.
Let Nsk :=
∑
i zikwis be the number of users that have the business attribute s and are
assigned to role k, and let si be the attribute of user i. We first simplify and reorganize
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Eq. (24) using these auxiliary variables
R(S) =
1
N
∑
s
∑
i
wis
∑
k
(Nsk − 2zikNsk)
=
1
N
∑
i
∑
k
(Nsik − 2zikNsik)
=
∑
i,k
(1− zik) Nsik
N
−
∑
i,k
zik
Nsik
N
. (26)
In this formulation, it becomes apparent that user i with attribute si should be assigned to
the role k (zik = 1) if many users have attribute si and role k.
Finally, we decompose the costs into individual contributions of users and role sets. We
use the notion of user-to-role set assignments ziL to substitute the user-role assignments by
zik =
∑
L ziLzLk:
R(S) =
∑
i,k
((
1−
∑
L
ziLzLk
)
Nsik
N
−
∑
L
ziLzLk
Nsik
N
)
=
∑
i,L
ziL
(∑
k/∈L
Nsik
N
−
∑
k∈L
Nsik
N
)
=
∑
i,L
ziLR
(S)
i,L . (27)
In this form we can directly compare the business cost function with the likelihood costs given
by Eq. (22). We can therefore easily compute the expectation in the E-step by substituting
the costs in Eq. ( 25) with RiL = R
(ll)
i,L +R
(S)
i,L .
In the iterative update procedure of the deterministic annealing scheme, one faces a
computational problem arising from a recursion. The optimal assignments ziL depend on the
Nsik, which are, in turn, computed from the ziL themselves. To make this computation at
step t of our algorithm feasible, we use the expected assignments γ
(t−1)
iL := E
[
z
(t−1)
iL
]
of the
previous step instead of the Boolean z
(t)
iL to approximate N
(t)
sik
by its current expectation with
respect to the Gibbs distribution:
N
(t)
sik
≈ E
[
N
(t−1)
sik
]
=
∑
L
zLk
∑
i′
wi′siγ
(t−1)
i′L . (28)
We do not have a proof of convergence for this algorithm. However we observe that when
running it multiple times with random initializations, it repeatedly finds the same solution
with low costs in terms of business information and model likelihood.
6.1 Selecting relevant user attributes
An important step for hybrid role mining is selecting of the set of user attributes used
as input for the optimizer. User attributes that do not provide information about the users’
permissions should not be used for hybrid role mining. In fact, requiring that the roles group
together users with irrelevant attributes can result in inferred RBAC configurations that are
worse than those inferred without using the attributes.
To select appropriate user attributes, we propose an information theoretic measure of
relevance. Let the random variable Xd ∈ {0, 1} be the assignment of permission d to a
generic user. S is the random variable that corresponds to the business attribute of a generic
user (e.g. “job code”) and let s be one of the actual values that S can take (e.g. “accountant”).
Let p(xd) := 1/N ·
∑
i xid be the empirical probability of d being assigned to an unspecified
user, and let p(xd|S = s) := 1/N ·
∑
i xidwis be the empirical probability of d being assigned
to a user with business attribute s. With these quantities, we define the binary entropy, the
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conditional entropy, and the mutual information as:
h(Xd) := −
∑
xd∈{0,1}
p(xd) log2 (p(xd)) , (29)
h(Xd|S) := −
∑
s∈S
p(s)
∑
xd∈{0,1}
p(xd|S = s) log2 (p(xd|S = s)) , (30)
I(Xd;S) := h(Xd)− h(Xd|S) . (31)
The entropy h(Xd) quantifies the uncertainty about whether a user is assigned permission
d. The conditional entropy h(Xd|S) is the uncertainty for a user whose business attribute
S is known. The mutual information I(Xd;S) is the absolute increment of information
about the user-permission assignment gained by knowledge of S. This number indicates how
relevant the attribute S is for the assignment of permissions. There is one pitfall, though.
If one compares this score on different permissions d with different entropies h(Xd), then
low-entropic permissions will have a smaller score simply because there is little entropy to
reduce. We therefore compute the relative mutual information ([6], p. 45) as a measure of
relevance:
ρd(S) := I(Xd;S)/h(Xd) = 1− h(Xd|S)/h(Xd) . (32)
We use the convention 0/0 := 1 for the case where h(Xd) = 0 (then I(Xd;S) will also be
0). This number can be interpreted as the fraction of all bits in Xd that are shared with S.
Alternatively, ρd(S) can be read as the fraction of missing information about permission d
that is removed by the knowledge of S.
Limit of few observations per business attribute One should take care to use suf-
ficiently many observations when estimating the relevance ρd(S) of a business attribute S.
With too few observations, this measure is biased towards high relevance. Imagine the prob-
lem of estimating the entropy of a fair coin based on only one observation (being heads
without loss of generality). Na¨ıvely computing the empirical probability of heads to be 1
provides an entropy of 0, which differs considerably from the true entropy of a fair coin which
is 1 bit. The same effect occurs when one computes the permission entropy conditioned on
an irrelevant attribute where only one observation per attribute value is available. In [31], for
instance, the last name of a user was found to be highly relevant! A practical solution is to
compute ρd(S) with only those values of S where sufficiently many observations are available.
For instance, if more than 10 users have the feature s=“Smith”, the empirical probability
p(xd|S = s) will give a good estimate of h(xd|S = s). In our experiments, we neglected all
attribute values with less than 10 observations.
We apply the proposed relevance measure to the two different user attributes of the
LE-access dataset, the job code (JC) and the organizational unit (OU) of a user. The first
attribute is each user’s so-called job code, which is a number that indexes the kind of contract
that the user has. We initially believed that this attribute would be highly relevant for each
user’s permission as it is indicative of the user’s business tasks. We compute the relevance
of these two attributes for each permission. The results are depicted in Figure 10. In these
histograms, we count the number of permissions for which the respective user attribute has
the given relevance score. As can be seen, the average reduction in entropy is much higher
for the OU (87.8%) than for JC (49.7%). This result means that knowledge of the OU
almost determines most of the permissions of the users while the JC provides relatively little
information about the permissions. We therefore only use OU in our role mining experiment.
6.2 Results for hybrid role mining
We run experiments on the LE-access dataset. This time, we use the adapted E-step as
derived in Section 6 with the organizational unit (OU) of the user as the business attribute
S. Again, we randomly split the data into a training set and a test set, learn the roles on
the training set, and then compute the generalization error on the test set. This time, we fix
the number of roles to k = 30 and only study the influence of the business attributes on the
result by varying the mixing parameter λ.
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Figure 10: Distribution of the measure of relevance Eq. (32), the mutual information weighted
with inverse permission entropy.
To evaluate how well the resulting role configuration corresponds to the business attributes
of the user, we compute the average conditional role entropy:
h(L|S) :=− 1
N
N∑
i=1
∑
L
p(ziL|S = si) log2 (p(ziL|S = si)) . (33)
This number indicates how hard it is to guess the role assignments ziL of a user i given his
organizational unit si. For a good RBAC configuration this entropy is small, meaning that
the knowledge of the organizational unit suffices to determine the set of roles that the user
has. If the RBAC configuration does not correspond to the organizational units at all, then
knowledge of this attribute does not provide information about a user’s roles and, as a result,
the role entropy is high. The advantage of the conditional role entropy over other measures of
dispersion such as, for instance, nominal variance [8] or attribute-spread [3], is that it directly
resembles the task of an administrator who must assign roles to new users. When deciding
which roles should be assigned to a user given his business attributes, there should be as
little uncertainty as possible. For the same reason, we select relevant business information
by relative mutual information instead of heuristic scores such as “mineability” [5].
Figure 11: Generaliza-
tion error versus condi-
tional role entropy for the
experiment using organiza-
tion units. The dashed
lines represent the stan-
dard deviation over ten re-
peated experiments.
We depict the results in Figure 11. We plot the role entropy against the generalization
error. Each point on this line is the median result over ten experiments with different random
splits in the training set and the test set. Each point is computed with a different mixing
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parameter λ. The plot demonstrates that by increasing the influence of the organizational
unit, the role entropy decreases while the generalization error increases. This reduction means
that hybrid role mining with this attribute requires a trade-off. Fortunately, most reduction in
role entropy can be achieved without significantly increasing the generalization error. When
further increasing λ, the generalization error increases without significantly improving role
entropy. This insensitivity indicates a Pareto-optimum (marked with a circle in Figure 11),
which defines the influence that one should give to user attributes in hybrid role mining.
Note that, we are able to find this point (to produce Figure 11) without knowledge of the
true roles.
7 Related work
Shortly after the development of RBAC [12], researchers and practitioners alike recognized
the importance of methods for role engineering, see for instance [7]. As explained in the
introduction, these methods can be classified as being either top-down or bottom-up. Top-
down methods use process descriptions, the organizational structure of the domain, or features
of the employees as given by the Human Resources Department of an enterprise, to create
roles. [32], for instance, present a scenario-driven approach where a scenario’s requirements
are analyzed according to its associated tasks. Permissions are then granted that enable
the task to be completed. In [10], a work flow is proposed to manually engineer roles by
analyzing business processes. Today, all pure top-down approaches are manually carried out.
Bottom-up role methods have the advantage that they can be partially or fully automated
by role mining algorithms, thereby relieving administrators from this time-consuming and
error-prone task.
The first bottom-up role mining algorithm was proposed in [24] and coined role mining.
Since then, a number of different bottom-up approaches have been presented. For instance,
the algorithm of [33] merges sets of permissions to construct a tree of candidate roles. After-
wards, it selects the final roles from this tree such that, at every step, the permissions of a
maximum number of users are covered. Subsequent role mining algorithms usually followed
a similar structure: they first construct a set of candidate roles and afterwards greedily select
roles from this set [37, 41, 2]. These algorithms differ from each other with respect to the
proposal creation step or the cost function used to select roles. Vaidya et al. formally defined
the role mining problem and variants in [35] and [36] and investigated the complexity of these
problems. The problem definitions proposed in these two papers differ from our role infer-
ence problem in that either the number of roles or the number of residuals tolerated when
fitting the RBAC configuration is given as input. Moreover, these definitions aim at a high
compression rate, while role inference aims at discovering the latent roles that underlie the
data.
The results presented in this paper build upon our prior work. In [14], we analyze the
different definitions of role mining and define the role inference problem. In [13], we derive
DDM from the deterministic permission assignment rule in RBAC. In [34], we propose the
MAC model, which we explore further in [17], adding different noise processes. [15] focuses
on determining the number of roles for role mining in particular, and selecting the number
of patterns in unsupervised learning in general. Finally, in [16] we propose the hybrid role
mining algorithm that we revisit in Section 6.
In this paper, we extend and generalize our prior work. In particular, we draw connec-
tions between all these concepts and approaches. We thereby generalize them within one
consistent framework that covers i) the definition of role mining, ii) the approach to solve it,
and iii) methods to evaluate solutions. While in [14] we motivate the role inference problem
by analyzing the real-world requirements of RBAC, here we take a more direct approach. We
identify the input that is usually available in realistic scenarios and directly derive the role
inference problem from these assumptions. Moreover, we subsume the models of our prior
work, DDM and MAC, within one core model. In this way, we analyze the relationships
between them and highlight the influence of noise processes, role hierarchies, and constraints
on role assignments. This theoretical comparison of the models is supplemented by an ex-
perimental comparison of DDM, MAC, and other models and algorithms. In addition, we
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provide a sound measure of confidence for user permission assignments and investigate how
conservatively the proposed methods modify noisy assignments. We also show that DDM
is structurally equivalent to a MAC model constrained to every user only having one role.
Finally, our paper contains the first experimental comparison of DDM and MAC on both
synthetic and real-world data.
8 Conclusion
We put forth that, in contrast to conventional approaches, role mining should be approached
as a prediction problem, not as a compression problem. We proposed an alternative, the role
inference problem, with the goal of finding the RBAC configuration that most likely under-
lies a given access control matrix. This problem definition includes the hybrid role mining
scenario when additional information about the users or the system is available. To solve the
role inference problem, we derived a class of probabilistic models and analyzed several vari-
ants. On real-world access control matrices, our models demonstrate robust generalization
ability while other methods are rather fragile and their generalization ability depends on the
particular data analyzed.
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A Appendix
A.1 Marginalization
We convert the deterministic formula Eq. (6) into a probabilistic version by marginalizing out
the latent variables ukd from the joint distribution for ukd and xid. The joint distribution is
p(xid = 0,u∗d|β∗d, zi∗) = p(xid = 0|u∗d, zi∗)
∏
k
p(ukd|βkd) . (34)
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As a single bit xid depends on the outcome of a full bitvector u∗d of length K, one must
marginalize over all realizations of such bit-vectors.
Let Ω be the set of all possible binary vectors u∗d. Then the likelihood for xid = 0 is
p(xid = 0|β∗d, zi∗) (35)
=
∑
u∗d∈Ω
p(xid = 0,u∗d|β∗d, zi∗) (36)
=
∑
u∗d∈Ω
p(xid = 0|u∗d, zi∗)
∏
k
p(ukd|βkd) (37)
=
∑
u∗d∈Ω
∏
k
(1− ukd)zik
(
β1−ukdkd (1− βkd)ukd
)
(38)
=
∑
u∗d∈Ω
( ∏
k:zik=1
(1− ukd)zik β1−ukdkd (1− βkd)ukd
)( ∏
k:zik=0
β1−ukdkd (1− βkd)ukd
)
.
(39)
In the step from (38) to (39) we substituted the individual probabilities with their definitions
Eq. (3) and Eq. (6). In the last step, we separated the bit-vectors u∗d into the two cases where
zik = 1 and zik = 0. The first case cancels all contributions of the sum where zik = ukd = 1
and for zik = 1, ukd = 0 only the factor βkd remains. Therefore, it is convenient to introduce
a modified set of bit-vectors Ω′ = {u∗d ∈ Ω |ukd = 0 , for all k with zik = 1} ⊂ Ω, i.e., the
entries of ukd that are relevant for object i are fixed to 0. The likelihood then takes the
following compact form
p(xid=0|β∗d, zi∗)=
∑
u′∗d∈Ω′
{( ∏
k:zik=1
βkd
)( ∏
k:zik=0
β
1−u′kd
kd (1− βkd)u
′
kd
)}
. (40)
The sum in Eq. (40) has |Ω′| terms. Let us pick a particular k′′ with zik′′ = 0. Half of
the vectors in Ω′ have uk′′j = 1 and the other half have uk′′j = 0, whereas the remaining
bits k 6= k′′ are equal in both halves. We can therefore factor out the terms where bitvectors
differ only at position k′′ in Eq. (40). This reduces the number of terms in the sum by a
factor of two, whereby the sum now ranges over the modified set Ω′′ ⊂ Ω′, where all bits are
varied except for k′′.
In the following steps, we recursively factor out such terms. This successively interchanges
the sum and the product in Eq. (40) and makes it easy to see, in Eq. (43), that all contributions
with zik = 0 sum up to 1.
p(xid = 0|β∗d, zi∗) (41)
= β
zik′′
k′′j ((1− βk′′j) + βk′′j)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1 ∀k′′
∑
u′′∗d∈Ω′′
( ∏
k : zik = 1
k 6= k′′
βzikkd
)( ∏
k : zik = 0
k 6= k′′
β
1−u′′kd
kd (1− βkd)u
′′
kd
)
(42)
=
(∏
k
βzikkd
)( ∏
k:zik=0
∑
u′kd∈{0,1}
β
1−u′kd
kd (1− βkd)u
′
kd
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1 ∀k
)
=
∏
k
βzikkd (43)
A.2 Hierarchies
We compute the probability that a user is not assigned to a permission in a two-level role
hierarchy given the probabilities of independent role hierarchy parameters. We start from
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Eq. (9).
p
(
xid |z+i∗,y+∗d, V +
)
= p
 K∨
k=1
[
zik ∧
(
L∨
l=1
vkl ∧ yld
)]
|z+i∗,y+∗d, V +
 1≤k≤K
1≤l≤L (44)
=
∏
k
p
(
zik ∧
(∨
l
vkl ∧ yld
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:ukd
|z+i∗,y+∗d,v+k∗
)
(45)
=
∏
k
(
p
(
zik∧ukd|z+ik,y+∗d,v+k∗
)
+p
(
zik∧ukd|z+ik,y+∗d,v+k∗
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=p(zik|z+ik)=1−z+ik
+p
(
zik∧ukd|z+ik,y+∗d,v+k∗
))
(46)
=
∏
k
(
1− z+ik + z+ik p(ukd|y+∗d,v+k∗)
)
(47)
Note that in the step from (45) to (46), the correct probability is only obtained when summing
over the probabilities of exclusive events (in particular: a ∧ b = a ∨ b but p (a ∧ b) 6= p (a) +
p
(
b
)
). Given the generation ukd =
∨
l vkl ∧ yld., we have that
p(ukd|y+∗d,v+k∗) =
∏
l
p
(
vkl ∧ yld|y+ld, v+kl
)
=
∏
l
[
p(yld|y+ld) + p(yld|y+ld)p(vkl|v+kl)
]
. (48)
Substituting this into Eq. (47) yields
p
(
xid |z+i∗,y+∗d, V +
)
=
∏
k
(
1− z+ik + z+ik
∏
l
(
1− y+ld) + y+ld(1− v+kl)
))
. (49)
A.3 Gibbs Sampling Algorithm for DDM
Here, we derive all necessary distributions for the Gibbs sampling algorithm for DDM in
Section 4.2. We start by collecting all distributions that define the model. The data likelihood
of the model is
p (X|Z,Y,β) =
∏
k,l
(1− βkl)n
(1)
kl β
n
(0)
kl
kl , (50)
with the counters n
(1)
kl =
∑
i:zik=1,
j:ylj=1
I{xij=1} and n
(0)
kl =
∑
i:zik=1,
j:ylj=1
I{xij=0} . The parameters
βkl are random variables themselves. They follow the Beta distribution
Pb (βkl; γ, γ) =
Γ(2γ)
2Γ(γ)
(βkl(1− βkl))γ−1 = B(γ, γ)−1 (βkl(1− βkl))γ−1 . (51)
Here B(., .) is the beta function, also known as “Euler integral of the first kind”.
In each step, one must sample new assignments of user i′ to roles from the distribution
p (zi′k=1|X, zi 6=i′∗,Y) = const · p (X|Z,Y) p (zi′k=1|zi6=i′∗) . (52)
Assigning permissions to roles (updating Y) has the same form, just with Y and Z inter-
changed. In order to compute this term for a particular user i′, one must compute the
evidence term p (X|Z,Y) and the Dirichlet process prior p (zi′k=1|zi 6=i′∗) for all available
roles k ∈ {1, ...,K} and for a potential new role with index K + 1. We introduced the
Dirichlet process prior p (zi′k=1|zi 6=i′∗) in Section 3.4. The evidence term is
p (X|Z,Y) =
∫
p (X,β|Z,Y) dβ = p (X|Z,Y,β) p (β|Z,Y)
p (β|Z,Y,X) . (53)
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So far, we just applied Bayes’ rule. The numerator is a product of terms that we already have:
the data likelihood in Eq. (50) and the Beta distributions p (β|Z,Y) = ∏k,l Pb (βkl; γ, γ). The
term in the denominator is the posterior probability p (β|Z,Y,X) (the probability of β after
having observed the data X). We can rewrite this (again using Bayes) to
p (β|Z,Y,X) = p (X|Z,Y,β)
∏
k,l Pb (βkl; γ, γ)
p (X|Z,Y) (54)
= const · p (X|Z,Y,β)
∏
k,l
Pb (βkl; γ, γ) (55)
= const ·
∏
k,l
(1− βkl)n
(1)
kl +γ−1 βn
(0)
kl +γ−1
kl . (56)
Comparison with the Beta distribution makes it easy to identify how this probability must
be normalized. Therefore, we can analytically compute the posterior:
p (β|Z,Y,X) =
∏
k,l
Γ(n
(1)
kl + n
(0)
kl + 2γ)
Γ(n
(1)
kl + γ)Γ(n
(0)
kl + γ)
(1− βkl)n
(1)
kl +γ−1 βn
(0)
kl +γ−1
kl (57)
=
∏
k,l
B(n
(1)
kl + γ, n
(0)
kl + γ)
−1 (1− βkl)n
(1)
kl +γ−1 βn
(0)
kl +γ−1
kl . (58)
The Beta distribution is a conjugate prior of the Bernoulli distribution. As a consequence,
the posterior of a Bernoulli likelihood and a Beta prior again has the form of a Bernoulli
distribution as we just observed in the last derivation. Substituting the posterior back to
Eq. (53) results in the analytic expression of the evidence term.
p (X|Z,Y) =
∏
k,l
B(n
(1)
kl + γ, n
(0)
kl + γ)
B(γ, γ)
(59)
Computation of this term only involves updating the two counters.
A.4 Marginalization of the noise indicator ξ
Let us assume the random noise indicator ξid follows a Bernoulli distribution
p (ξid | ) = ξid (1− )1−ξid . (60)
The structural bit is generated by the structure model pflat (xid |Z,β) (Eq. 13), the noise bit
is generated by the Bernoulli distribution pN
(
xNid | r
)
, and the observable bit is generated by
xid = (1− ξid)xSid + ξidxNid . (61)
Using these distributions, the joint probability of xid and ξid is
p (xid, ξ |Z,β, r, ) =
∏
id
( · pN (xid | r))ξid · ((1− ) · pflat (xid |Z,β))1−ξid . (62)
We sum over all possible outcomes of all noise indicators and obtain the final likelihood of
this mixture noise model.
pM (X |Z,β, r, ) =
∑
{ξ}
∏
id
( · pN (xid | r))ξid · ((1− ) · pflat (xid |Z,β))1−ξid (63)
=
∏
id
∑
ξid∈{0,1}
( · pN (xid | r))ξid · ((1− ) · pflat (xid |Z,β))1−ξid (64)
=
∏
id
( · pN (xid | r) + (1− ) · pflat (xid |Z,β)) . (65)
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A.5 Update equations for deterministic annealing
We define the empirical risk of assigning a user i to the set of roles L as the negative log-
likelihood of the permissions xi∗ being generated by role set L, given parameters Θ = (β, , r):
RiL := − log p(xi·|L,Θ) = −
∑
d
log (xid (1− qLd) + (1− xid)qLd) ,
where for the auxiliary variable we have that qLd := r + (1− ) (1− βLd).
The responsibility γiL of the assignment-set L for data item i is given by
γiL :=
exp (−RiL/T )∑
L′∈L exp (−RiL′/T )
. (66)
In this way, the matrix γ defines a probability distribution over the space of all clustering
solutions. The expected empirical risk EG [R] of the solutions under this distribution G is
EG [RiL] =
∑
i
∑
L γiLRiL. Finally, the partition function Z and the free energy F are
defined as follows.
Z :=
∏
i
∑
L
exp (−RiL/T ) F := −T logZ = −T
∑
i
log
(∑
L
exp (−RiL/T )
)
. (67)
Given the above, we derive the updates of the model parameters based on the first-order
condition of the free energy F . We therefore introduce the generic model parameter θ, which
stands for any of the model parameters, i.e. θ ∈ {βµν , , r}. Here, µ is some particular value
of role index k and ν is some particular value of permission index d. Using this notation, the
derivative of the free energy with respect to θ is given by
∂F
∂θ
=
∑
i
∑
L
γiL
∂RiL
∂θ
=
∑
i
∑
L
γiL
∑
d
(1− 2xid)∂qLd∂θ
xid (1− qLd) + (1− xid)qLd . (68)
The partial derivatives with respect to θ ∈ {βµν , , r} are:
∂
∂βµν
qLd = (1− )βL\{µ},d I{ν=d}I{µ∈L} , ∂
∂
qLd = 1− r − βLd , ∂
∂r
qLd = − . (69)
This results in the following first-order conditions for the individual role parameter updates
and the noise parameter updates:
βµν :
∑
L:µ∈L
βL\{µ},ν
{ ∑
i:xiν=1
γiL
r + (1− ) (1− βLν) −
∑
i:xiν=0
γiL
1− r − (1− ) (1− βLν)
}
= 0 (70)
 :
∑
d
{∑
L
(1−r−βLd)
∑
i:xid=1
γiL
r + (1− ) (1− βLd) −
∑
L
(1−r−βLd)
∑
i:xid=0
γiL
1− r − (1− ) (1− βLd)
}
= 0 (71)
r :
∑
d
{∑
L
∑
i:xid=0
γiL
1− r − (1− ) (1− βLd) −
∑
L
∑
i:xid=1
γiL
r + (1− ) (1− βLd)
}
= 0 (72)
Here, βL\{µ},ν =
∏
k∈L,k 6=µ βkν and
∑
L:µ∈L is the sum over all role sets containing role µ.
As there is no analytic expression for the solutions of the above equations, we use Newton’s
method we find the root.
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